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ADVANCE DIRECTIVES: A CASE OF
CHANGING SOCIAL NORMS AND THEIR
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
IRA BEDZOW*
The frequently used terms “death with dignity” and the “right to
die” encompass two ethically distinct concepts in the current debate
over the autonomy of patients to end their lives, namely physician-
assisted suicide and the right to refuse medical treatment.  Although
physician-assisted suicide has claimed the public spotlight, the right to
refuse medical treatment has greater implications for patients and
physicians.  The right to refuse medical treatment and end-of-life deci-
sion-making arise more frequently and affect greater numbers of
patients than does physician-assisted suicide.1  Moreover, as the gen-
eral population of this country ages, debates over the direction of end-
of-life care will only continue to expand in significance and scope.
The growth of advance directive legislation2 is a result of public
awareness and the increasing priority accorded to patient auton-
* Ira Bedzow, Ph.D., is the Director of Biomedical Ethics and Humanities at New
York Medical College and the Senior Scholar at the Aspen Center for Social Values.
1 While both physician-assisted suicide and the right to die involve the idea that
individual autonomy should be primary, the ethical and legal considerations diverge due to
the ethical distinction between active killing and allowing to die. Physician-assisted suicide
is about the ethics of sanctioning the act of killing, whereas right to die cases involve a
passivity in allowing the patient to refuse medical treatment, even if such treatment would
be life-saving. In the latter, nature (and death) is allowed to take its course without human
intervention. This just provides the ethical pivot between the two; the analysis between all
of the components and implications of each would be too large a comparison for the scope
of this article. See ROBERT M. VEATCH, THE BASICS OF BIOETHICS 85-91 (2d ed. 2002).
2 A. E. Fade, Advance Directives: Keeping up with Changing Legislation, 16 TODAY’S
OR NURSE 23, 23 (1994). The Patient Self-Determination Act (“PSDA”) of 1991 required
hospitals to provide patients with information regarding their right to make advance
directives pursuant to state law. Id. at 25-26. Further, upon admission, hospitals were
required to determine whether a patient had an advance directive. However, the PSDA
allowed individual states to determine the details, administration, requirements, and
restrictions of such documents. Id. at 26. This resulted in significant variation in state
policies relating to advance directives, involving areas such as the evidentiary threshold to
cease intervention, the specific language or forms that must be used, whether a witness or
notary must be present when drafting the document, etc. In an attempt to establish more
uniformity across states, a number of states have enacted the Uniform Health Care
Decisions Act. To download each state’s advance directives legislation, visit the National
Hospice and Palliative Care Organization website. Download Your State’s Advance
Directives, NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., http://www.caringinfo.org/i4a/
pages/index.cfm?pageid=3289 (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
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omy.3  Recently, the Care Planning Act of 2015 was introduced to
create a Medicare benefit for people with grave illnesses to work with
their doctors to define, articulate, and document their desired end-of-
life goals.4  The American Medical Association, as stated in its Code
of Ethics, also supports advance care planning and has asserted that
physicians should comply with patients’ directives.5  Yet, despite the
increase in the significance given to individual patient autonomy, cur-
rent laws regarding advance directives6 give little recourse to incom-
petent patients7 when physicians dismiss their desire to refuse end-of-
3 David J. Rothman, The Origins and Consequences of Patient Autonomy: A 25-year
Retrospective, 9 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 255 (2001). Patient autonomy began to be
asserted as a central principle in medical ethics starting in the 1960s. Id. at 255-56.
4 Care Planning Act of 2015, S. 1549, 114th Cong. (2015).
5 AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 2.191 - Advance Care Planning, AM. MED.
ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion2191.page (last visited Mar. 1, 2016); see also AMA Ethics Resource Center,
End of Life Care, Advance Care Directives, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/about-ethics-group/ethics-resource-center/
end-of-life-care/advance-care-directives.page (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
6 Medical advance directives can take the form of a living will, a proxy directive, or a
combination of both. A “living will” is an instruction directive about the kind of medical
care an individual would or would not want for his or her end-of-life care. THE
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING IN OUR
AGING SOCIETY 57 (2005). A proxy directive allows a patient to choose a surrogate
decision-maker when he or she becomes incompetent. Id. at 58. Advance directives are
meant to give patients the ability to choose their course of medical treatment even after
they lose decision-making capacity. Id. at 57. They are a means to preserve patient
autonomy by giving patients anticipatory decision-making capability. Id. One difficulty
with giving advance directives the same decision-making authority as contemporaneous
statements made by competent individuals is the assumption that an incompetent patient’s
current wishes are consistent with their past wishes as expressed in their directive is a
difficult assertion to make. Id. at 55. See Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Quality
of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox
Approach, 17 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 234 (1989). Ronald Dworkin, however, argues that
despite the fact that a person’s interests may change after becoming incompetent, it
nevertheless does not undermine the authority of advance directives. RONALD DWORKIN,
LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM, 190-91 (1993) but see Agnieszka Jaworska, Respecting the Margins of Agency:
Alzheimer’s Patients and the Capacity to Value, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105 (1999) in which
Jaworski limits Dworkin’s view. The first legal literature on advance directives was written
by Louis Kutner. Louis Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal 44
IND. L.J. 539 (1969).
7 In the medico-legal literature, a distinction is made between mental capacity and
competence. In order for a person to exercise autonomy, he or she must be able to
understand the information upon which the choice is made. This implies that the patient
has capacity to do so. Capacity is determined by a “functional” test which assesses whether
the person has the mental faculties to make rational decisions. It is generally assumed that
if a patient can understand a procedure, judge the risks and benefits associated with it, and
make a decision of whether to undergo the procedure or not, then the patient has capacity.
Any physician can determine whether a patient has capacity or not, except when the
patient has a mental illness; in those cases, a psychiatrist is often needed to determine
capacity. Competence, on the other hand, is a legal concept where the state defines who
2
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life treatment.8  Courts have also been unwilling to recognize claims
made on behalf of incompetent patients whose physicians have
ignored their advance directives.9  For this reason, scholars have called
the statutory right to refuse end-of-life care an “illusory protection,”10
a “false promise,”11 and a “right without a remedy.”12  In a 2004 Has-
tings report,13 Angela Fagerlin and Carl Schneider, of the University
of Michigan Center for Bioethics and Social Sciences in Medicine,
wrote that living wills have failed and that they do not, and cannot,
has a presumption of capacity. Those who do not meet the state’s threshold of competence
are deemed to lack the capacity to make some or all of their decisions and individuals are
appointed to make those decisions on their behalf. Adults are presumed to be competent
unless a court has ruled otherwise. However, if a person previously had capacity, his or her
decisions that were made when capable/competent are valid even after he or she loses
capacity. This allows for the use of advance directives.
8 Many advance directive statutes confine the use of advance directives to end-of-life
decision-making and are limited to patients who are either terminally ill or in persistent
vegetative states. Robert S. Olick, Defining Features of Advance Directives in Law and
Clinical Practice, 141 CHEST J. 232, 233 (2012).
9 M. Rose Gasner, Financial Penalties for Failing to Honor Patient Wishes to Refuse
Treatment, 11 ST. LOUIS. U. PUB. L. REV. 499 (1992); Nicole Marie Saitta & Samuel D.
Hodge, Jr., What are the Consequences of Disregarding a ‘Do Not Resuscitate Directive’ in
the United States? 32 MED. & L. 441 (2013); Nicole Marie Saitta & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr.,
Wrongful Prolongation of Life-A Cause of Action That Has Not Gained Traction Even
Though a Physician Has Disregarded a “Do Not Resuscitate” Order, 30 TEMP.  J. SCI.
TECH. & ENVTL. L. 221 (2011) (hereinafter, Wrongful Prolongation of Life-A Cause of
Action); see also Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directives for Life-
Sustaining Care, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 882, 885-87 (1991); DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING
LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY 175 (1987); Sylvia McSkimming et al. The
Experience of Life-Threatening Illness: Patients’ and Their Loved Ones’ Perspectives, 2 J.
PALLIATIVE MED. 173, 180-82 (1999).
10 Marni J. Lerner, State Natural Death Acts: Illusory Protection of Individuals’ Life-
Sustaining Treatment Decisions, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 177 (1992); see also Saitta &
Hodge, Jr., Wrongful Prolongation of Life-A Cause of Action, supra note 9.
11 Mark Strasser, A Jurisprudence in Disarray: On Battery, Wrongful Living, and the
Right to Bodily Integrity, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 997, 998 (1999); see also Maggie J.
Randall Robb, Living Wills: The Right to Refuse Life Sustaining Medical Treatment—A
Right Without a Remedy?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 169 (1997); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, The
Right to Refuse Medical Treatment: Where There Is a Right, There Ought to Be a Remedy,
25 N. KY. L. REV. 649 (1998); Henry S. Perkins, Controlling Death: The False Promise of
Advance Directives, 147 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 51 (2007).
12 A. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The Wrongful Living
Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625 (1986); Strasser, supra note 11, at 1039-40; see also
Maggie J. Randall Robb, supra note 11, at 170; S. Elizabeth Wilborn, supra note 11, at 651.
13 Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, 34
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30 (2004). The Hastings Center Report explores the ethical, legal,
and social issues in medicine, health care, public health, and the life sciences. About the
Hastings Center Report , THE HASTINGS CTR., http://www.thehastingscenter.org/
Publications/HCR/About.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2016). The Hastings Center is an
independent, nonpartisan, and nonprofit bioethics research institute founded in 1969.
About Us: Our Mission, THE HASTINGS CTR., http://www.thehastingscenter.org/About/
Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
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achieve the goal of patient autonomy.14  Courts are more responsive
to requests to enjoin physicians to comply with advance directives in
cases where the patient’s wishes may still be followed.15 Yet they have
been reluctant to award damages when a patient was forced to endure
a lingering death contrary to advance instructions.16
The difference between the public support for patient autonomy
and the courts’ (as well as advance directive statutes) seeming disre-
gard of a patient’s wishes has been ascribed to a tension between the
priority of the individual versus interests of the state. Since the first
end-of-life cases that dealt with refusing medical treatment, the courts
have made it clear that the right of an incompetent patient to refuse
treatment is not all-encompassing;17 rather, it must be honored if it
supersedes state interests. However, the courts oftentimes require the
state to demonstrate that it has a compelling interest that outweighs a
14 Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 13, at 30. In applying the right to refuse treatment
as stated in Cruzan to include an avenue for recourse if that right is violated, John
Donohue sums up the difficulty of advance directive legislation and litigation as follows:
“The right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment as recognized in Cruzan may prove to be
a right in name only. While the Supreme Court and federal and state legislatures have
taken steps to recognize and effectuate the right to die, the courts of this country have
generally refused to hold that an infringement upon this right precipitates a compensable
harm. The reluctance to recognize damages in actions asserting a violation of the right to
die has been guided by a categorical refusal to recognize life as a cognizable injury
deserving monetary damages.” John Donohue, “Wrongful Living”: Recovery for a
Physician’s Infringement on an Individual’s Right to Die, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 391, 417 (1997) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
15 Kellen F. Rodriguez, Suing Health Care Providers for Saving Lives: Liability for
Providing Unwanted Life-Sustaining Treatment, 20 J. L. MED. 1 (1999) “The question that
must be answered is: ‘What can be done to encourage physicians to follow patient decisions
to stop heroic care at the end of life?’ Patients and their families have legal recourse when
their life-sustaining treatment decisions are not followed. As an immediate response, they
can petition a court for an injunction or order directing the provider to remove or withhold
the life-sustaining treatment. Liability against a provider is not sought in these suits.
Rather, the relief the plaintiff seeks is simply a court order to enjoin the provider from
continuing the life-sustaining treatment. Patients and their families have been following
this route for more than two decades; the result almost always being the removal of the
treatment.” Id. at 2 (internal footnotes omitted). In support, Rodriguez cites In re Travel,
661 A.2d 1061, 1068-69 (Del. 1995); Browning v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4, 11 (Fla. 1990); and
DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 710 (Ky. 1993).
16 Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Delio v.
Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Blackman v.
NYC Health & Hosp. Corp., 660 N.Y.S.2d 643, 648-49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997); In re
Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); see also Kellen F. Rodriguez, supra note
15; Vicki Joiner Bowers, Advance Directives: Peace of Mind or False Security?, 26 STETSON
L. REV. 677 (1996).
17 See section titled “The Autonomy of Competent and Incompetent Patients” infra pp.
102-103. See also Robert M. Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent
Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1975). “As a general rule the exercise of any right may be
limited if it conflicts with compelling state interests, at least where there are not less drastic
means available to accomplish the state purpose.” Id. at 16.
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patient’s right to refuse medical treatment.18  Therefore, in an end-of-
life case involving a patient who lacks capacity, even if there is an
advance directive, there still might be a legal presumption (and a med-
ical proclivity19) that life should be preserved, though the priority of
18 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 635-39 (Mass. 1986)
(asserting state interest wanes where issue is when, not whether, death will occur);
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424-27, 435 (Mass.
1977) (recognizing state’s interest in preserving life diminishes where incompetent has no
hope for recovery); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119, 123 (1980) (recognizing state’s
interest less compelling where patient suffers from incapacitating disease); NANCY M. P.
KING, MAKING SENSE OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 62-66 (rev. ed. 1996) (explaining strong
state interest when patient curable but weak interest when patient’s condition hopeless).
19 With respect to the medical profession’s inclination towards preserving life, see AMA
Code of Ethics, Opinion 2.21 - Euthanasia, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, http://
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/
opinion221.page? (last visited Mar. 1, 2016) and AMA Code of Ethics, Opinion2.211 –
Physician-Assisted Suicide, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.ama-assn.org/
ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2211.page? (last
visited Mar. 1, 2016). It should be emphasized that the focus is on preserving life and not
treatment per se and thus a physician is not ethically obligated to treat patients when it will
not lead to the preservation of life. “Physicians are not ethically obligated to deliver care
that, in their best professional judgment, will not have a reasonable chance of benefiting
their patients. Patients should not be given treatments simply because they demand them.
Denial of treatment should be justified by reliance on openly stated ethical principles and
acceptable standards of care.” AMA Code of Ethics, Opinion 2.035 – Futile Care,
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, https://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-
resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2035.page (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
Physician reluctance to allow patients to refuse care is oftentimes due to a conflict in the
values physicians hold between beneficence and respecting patient autonomy. When
patient autonomy could result in maleficence to the patient, physicians frequently fall on
the side of life. As David Orentlicher noted, “end-of-life decisions are frequently driven by
the physician’s values rather than the patient’s values.” David Orentlicher, The Limitations
of Legislation, 53 MD. L. REV. 1255, 1281 (1994). Physician deference to beneficence over
patient autonomy therefore influences their disregard of advance directives, as
demonstrated by the situations in which advance directives are ignored. Physicians often
err on the side of caution when: (1) questions arise regarding an advance directive’s
authority in light of the patient’s competence when executed; (2) questions arise regarding
the context in which the directives are invoked; (3) when the directives conflict with
hospital policy, family preference, or practice standards; and (4) when the directives are
ambiguous and could be understood as erroneously communicating patient wishes. In each
situation, the clarity of the patient’s autonomous choice is opposed by presumptions that
are held by family members or implied interests that are presumed by society’s values. One
may argue that medical providers’ refusal to honor patients’ wishes regarding end-of-life
care is due to a fear of liability, yet physicians need not practice defensive medicine by
dismissing advance directives since state statutes often provide medical professionals
immunity in these situations. Furthermore, physicians will often dismiss directives to
prolong someone’s life if they think that medical treatment is futile. Renee M. Goetzler &
Mark A. Moskowitz, Changes in Physician Attitudes Toward Limiting Care of Critically Ill
Patients, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1537, 1538 (1991). Regarding why physicians
might ignore patients’ advance directives, Lynch et. al. writes that “physician behavior is
more likely to reflect a rational evaluation of risk. On one hand, saving a patient’s life,
even against the patient’s wishes, carries a risk of only limited sanctions or liability; on the
other, choosing not to treat a patient and thereby allowing him or her to die risks a
5
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individual autonomy is still the dominant consideration. Similarly,
proxy directives are limited by the authority expressly granted to the
proxy either by state legislation or through precedent, to speak on the
patient’s behalf by the standard of surrogate decision-making that is
acceptable in a particular state.20
This article provides an alternative view of the tension between
the priority of individual autonomy and state interests in end-of-life
cases involving the right to refuse treatment. First, it argues that the
state interest in preserving life, as well as other interests that the
courts use to balance against the patient’s right to refuse treatment, is
not an imposition of the state on individual autonomy.21  Rather, the
courts use “state interests” to protect individuals from a violation of
their own autonomy.  Just as the medical profession uses the notion of
“implied consent,” which allows physicians to rely on the general pre-
sumption that patients would consent to be treated at a time when
malpractice suit with the potential for significant damages, increased insurance payments,
and harm to reputation.” Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Compliance with Advance
Directives: Wrongful Living and Tort Law Incentives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 148-49 (2008)
(footnote omitted); See also John M. Luce & Ann Alpers, Legal Aspects of Withholding
and Withdrawing Life Support from Critically Ill Patients in the United States and Providing
Palliative Care to Them, 162 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 2029 (2000);
David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a
Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 2609 (2005); ROBERT POWELL
CTR. FOR MED. ETHICS AT THE NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM., WILL YOUR ADVANCE
DIRECTIVE BE FOLLOWED? A REPORT BY THE ROBERT POWELL CENTER FOR MEDICAL
ETHICS (rev. ed. July 2015) www.nrlc.org/euthanasia/willtolive/PowellCenterReport13.pdf.;
Judy Greenwald, Medical Ethics & Risk Management: Liability at Life’s End; Providers
Risk Suits by Reviving Patients, BUS. INS. 1 (1996); Henry S. Perkins, supra note 11; David
A. Asch et al., Decisions to Limit or Continue Life-Sustaining Treatment by Critical Care
Physicians in the United States: Conflicts Between Physicians’ Practices and Patients’
Wishes, 151 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 288 (1995); Andrew J. Billings,
The Need for Safeguards in Advance Care Planning, 27 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 595
(2012); Timothy Gilligan & Thomas A. Raffin, Whose Death Is It, Anyway? 125 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 137 (1996); Joel M. Zinberg, Decisions for the Dying: An Empirical Study
of Physicians’ Responses to Advance Directives, 13 VT. L. REV. 445 (1989).
20 See, section titled “Surrogate Decision-Making & Proxy Directives” infra.
21 Judicial opinions have consistently recognized that the issue of medical decision-
making for currently incompetent individuals through advance directives is best left to the
legislature. See In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73-76 (N.Y. 1981); A.B. v. C., 477 N.Y.S.2d 281,
284 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 301, 306-07 (Ill. 1989)
(Clark, J., dissenting); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419,429 (N.J. 1987); In re Farell, 529 A.2d 404,
407-08 (N.J. 1987); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220-21 (N.J. 1985). Following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the
New York State Legislature passed Article 29-C: Health Care Agents and Proxies. N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980-2994 (McKinney 2013). See also Neal F. Splaine, The
Incompetent Individual’s Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: Legislating,
Not Litigating, A Profoundly Private Decision, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 905 (1993). Splaine
argues that the legislature, and not the courts, should establish a framework for surrogate
decision-making for incompetent persons. Id. at 908.
6
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they cannot give such consent explicitly,22 the courts use “state inter-
ests” as a way to rely on a general assumption of what an individual
may want when his or her desires are unknown or ambiguous.23  Simi-
larly, the different state standards relating to a proxy’s authority
reflect the level of risk the different states are willing to tolerate.
States have a genuine concern that the wishes of an incompetent
patient will be misrepresented, either through giving the proxy too
much leeway or not enough.
Second, this article demonstrates that there has been a steady
increase in the recognition of individual autonomy over state interests
both in legislation and in the courts. This trend has resulted in
increased support for injunctive relief to give effect to a patient’s
wishes.24  However, the increased recognition of patient autonomy has
still been limited in order to protect the ethical autonomy of medical
professionals involved in these end-of-life cases.  By failing to provide
remedies to patients whose physicians have imposed medical care con-
trary to their presumed wishes, legislators and the courts protect the
ethics of medical professionals so that they may practice according to
their professional standards without fear of being coerced, either
directly or indirectly, to act contrary to those standards. These profes-
sionals are shielded even when their actions may limit patient
autonomy.
THE AUTONOMY OF COMPETENT AND INCOMPETENT PATIENTS
Patient autonomy is the cornerstone of freedom.  As noted by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, for a competent patient, “[t]he
value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision to refuse
treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human being the
right of choice.”25  De jure, this right to autonomy does not disappear
22 Implied consent is consent that is not expressly granted by a person, but rather
inferred from a person’s actions and the facts and circumstances of a particular situation.
23 This does not include cases where the patient is in a prison and there are other state
interests that must be considered. See footnote 66.
24 Many living will statutes provide the option of transferring the patient if the medical
provider refuses to comply with the patient’s advance directive.  When this is not possible,
then the medical facility will be enjoined to comply with the patient’s wishes.
25 Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass.
1977) (footnote omitted). Saikewicz occurred shortly after In re Quinlan, 355 A2d 647
(N.J. 1976). Unlike in Quinlan, where the court relied on the guardian, physician, and
ethics committee to permit the termination of life-prolonging treatment for the
incompetent patient, in Saikewicz, the court considered the obligation to be primarily for
the courts. Saikewicz at 434-35. Despite the strong duty to determine the interests of the
incompetent patient, however, the court recognized that “the substantive rights of the
competent and the incompetent person are the same in regard to the right to decline
7
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when a patient lacks capacity.26  As such, an incompetent patient does
not lose his or her rights to decide the direction of medical care;
rather, the patient loses the ability to express his or her rights.  There-
fore, the question for the courts is how to uphold the patient’s inter-
ests given his or her inability to state them at present.  As the
Supreme Court of New Jersey has stated, “[s]ince the condition of an
incompetent patient makes it impossible to ascertain definitively his
present desires, a third party acting on the patient’s behalf often
cannot say with confidence that his treatment decision for the patient
will further rather than frustrate the patient’s right to control his own
body.”27 Ambiguity in the patient’s wishes creates a risk not only in
achieving what the patient wants but conversely in potentially vio-
lating his or her rights if those desires are misunderstood.  Since the
courts can only infer what the patient wants, when interpreting his or
her statements without any further clarification, the courts are more
cautious in enforcing ambiguous advance directives and tend to limit
the authority of the proxy for fear of getting it wrong.28  The varia-
bility of the courts’ standards for interpreting directives is due to the
differences in how courts conceive the proper way to infer intention,
given the gravity of the consequences, i.e. continued life or death.29
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO REFUSE END-OF-LIFE CARE
The first major case dealing with withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment from an incompetent patient in which the state had to inter-
pret the patient’s unspoken wishes was In re Quinlan.30   The patient
potentially life-prolonging treatment.” Id. at 423. The Saikewicz case is therefore a good
example of how the priority of autonomy is primary, yet the state, and not family or
friends, must protect it.
26 In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So.2d 365, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (“[T]he
constitutional right of privacy would be an empty right if one who is incompetent were not
granted the right to a competent counterpart to exercise his rights.”) (citing John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 432 So.2d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) Id.
In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 744 (Wash. 1983) (“An incompetent’s right to refuse treatment
should be equal to a competent’s right to do so. No court has denied an individual this right
because of incompetency to exercise it.”)
27 In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (N.J. 1985).
28 See section titled “Surrogate Decision-Making & Proxy Directives” infra.
29 See, e.g. In re Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001) (Due process dictates that clear and
convincing is the appropriate standard for review of a conservator’s decision to withhold
life-sustaining treatment because, even though Cal. Prob. Code §2355 gives the conservator
exclusive authority, the conservator’s exercise of decision-making power for the
conservatee concerning life-sustaining treatment creates a tension between the
conservatee’s fundamental right to life and the conservatee’s right to refuse medical
treatment, and the consequences of error are grave and irrevocable.).
30 Lynda M Tarantino, Withdrawal of Life Support: Conflict Among Patient Wishes,
Family, Physicians, Courts and Statutes, and the Law, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 623 (1994);
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had no hope of recovery and thus there was no medical benefit in
continuing to provide treatment.31  In Quinlan, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that an incapacitated patient’s constitutional
right of privacy encompasses a right to refuse treatment.32 However,
this right had to be balanced against other state interests, such as pre-
serving the sanctity of life and defending the right of the physician to
administer medical treatment according to his best judgment.  Both of
these interests allow for the protection of individual autonomy, since
the former is meant to protect Karen Quinlan in case her surrogate
was incorrect about her wishes, and the latter protects the physician.
In Quinlan’s case, the state interest in preserving life served as a coun-
terweight to the subjective understanding of her wishes by her
guardian, since it embodies a societal presumption that generally
people want to live.  This presumption was then weighed against the
facts of Quinlan’s condition.  Weighing these factors and ruling that
Karen Quinlan need not remain on life support, the court stated,
We think that the State’s interest contra weakens and the indi-
vidual’s right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims.  Ultimately there comes a point at
which the individual’s rights overcome the State interest.  It is for
that reason that we believe Karen’s choice, if she were competent to
make it, would be vindicated by the law.  Her prognosis is extremely
poor, — she will never resume cognitive life. And the bodily inva-
sion is very great, — she requires 24 hour intensive nursing care,
antibiotics, the assistance of a respirator, a catheter and feeding
tube.33
Matthew B. Hickey, Oklahoma Advance Directive Act: Denying Choice to Those Who
Cannot Choose-A Proposal for Legislative and Practical Alternatives, 59 OKLA. L. REV.
449, 451-52 (2006).
31 In re Quinlan, 355 A2d 647, 650 (N.J. 1976). Medical benefit is generally understood
as a physiological benefit through continued treatment. If there is no medical benefit to
treatment, then treatment is generally understood to be futile. CAROLINE YOUNG, CYNDIE
KOOPSEN, & DANIEL FARB, END OF LIFE CARE ISSUES GUIDEBOOK 117 (2005).
32 The Constitution does not expressly mention a right of privacy, but in Roe v. Wade
the Supreme Court noted that “the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” Roe
v. Wade, 410 US 113, 152 (1973). The Quinlan court addressed the right of privacy: “The
right we here discuss is included within the class of what have been called rights of
‘personality.’ See Pound, ‘Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to
Personality,’ 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640, 668-76 (1916). Equitable jurisdiction with respect to the
recognition and enforcement of such rights has long been recognized in New Jersey. See,
e.g., Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J. Eq. 910, 919-20 (E. & A. 1907).” In re Quinlan, 355 A2d
647, 66 n.7 (N.J. 1976). The Quinlan court also cites several United States Supreme Court
decisions, including Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S.557, (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as well as referencing the
New Jersey Constitution. N.J. Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 1. Id. at 663.
33 In re Quinlan, 355 A2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976).
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After Quinlan, despite the New Jersey court’s reliance on the consti-
tutional right of privacy, most courts relied on the common law doc-
trine of informed consent as the basis for the right to refuse treatment
in end-of-life cases,34 although a few relied on both principles.35
In the 1970s, there was still a measure of uncertainty about the
enforceability of advance directives since the constitutional right to
refuse treatment had not yet been firmly established.36  Therefore,
states began to enact legislation that formally recognized advance
medical decision-making.37  In 1976 California was the first state to
enact an advance directive statute.38  Titled the Natural Death Act
(hereinafter, the “Act”), the Act’s purpose was to legitimize living
wills and give security to the enforceability of advance directives.39
Barry Keene, the Act’s author explained the Act’s importance:
Conceived in the belief that the judiciary does not guarantee a
timely and convenient forum to protect the rights of the dying at the
time when they are systematically and deliberately stripped of their
autonomy, the Act offers a procedure to enable the terminally ill
patient to exercise control over decision-making relating to his med-
ical treatment.40
The statute was thus enacted to provide assurance for patient
autonomy. Other states followed suit, using the California statute as a
model.41
34 In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70 (N.Y. 1981); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J.
1985). The right to refuse treatment is a corollary of the right to exercise informed consent
for medical treatment. The common law requirement for informed consent is based on the
statement by Justice Cardozo, “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body.” Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y.
Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
35 Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424, 435
(Mass. 1977). The benefit of establishing a constitutional basis for the right to refuse
treatment through the right of privacy and not rely solely on the common law basis is that
states are no longer able to pass legislation that would undermine the right to refuse
treatment. Also, in cases where the patient is not competent, the common law right to
refuse treatment may not be recognized. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990).
36 ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-
LIFE DECISIONMAKING 7-20 (3d ed. 2004).
37 THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 6, at 59.
38 George J. Annas, The Health Care Proxy and the Living Will, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1210, 1210 (1991).
39 The Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (repealed 2000).
40 Barry Keene, The Natural Death Act: A Well-Baby Check-Up on its First Birthday,
315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 376, 376 (1978).
41 NANCY S. JECKER ET AL., BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY,
METHODS, AND PRACTICE 484 (2d ed. 2007).
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The next major end-of-life case advancing the “right to die”
debate was Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.42
Before the dispute reached the United States Supreme Court, the
Missouri Supreme Court held that medical nutrition could not be
withdrawn from a patient in a permanent vegetative state unless there
was an advance directive that was written in accordance with the
state’s living will statute or there was “clear and convincing” evidence
that the patient intended to decline the treatment.43  Also, because the
patient was neither terminally ill nor suffering, the court found that
there was no reason to act contrary to the state’s interest in preserving
life, since the interest in preserving life does not consider the quality
of life preserved.44  The Missouri Supreme Court recognized that
there was a right to refuse treatment grounded in the common-law
doctrine of informed consent, but expressed skepticism about its
application in this case.45  The Court also denied that there was a right
to refuse treatment grounded in the right of privacy in its State Consti-
tution and doubted whether such a right existed under the United
States Constitution.46  The appeal to the United States Supreme Court
asserted that there is a constitutional right to refuse treatment
grounded in the right of privacy, and that Missouri’s clear and con-
vincing evidence standard was so high that it violated a patient’s con-
stitutional right to refuse treatment.47  In his opinion in Cruzan, Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote, “[b]ut for purposes of this case, we assume
that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition.”48 This expanded the right to refuse treatment by giving
support to the notion that refusing treatment is a constitutional right
rather than solely a common law right, and, as a constitutional right, it
would be secure against any possible reversal by statute. However, it
also held that the Missouri’s clear and convincing evidence standard
was not unconstitutional.49 The Supreme Court stated,
Whether or not Missouri’s clear and convincing evidence
requirement comports with the United States Constitution depends
in part on what interests the State may properly seek to protect in
this situation. Missouri relies on its interest in the protection and
42 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
43 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424-26 (Mo. 1988).
44 Id. at 419, 424.
45 Id. at 416-17.
46 Id. at 417-18.
47 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
48 Id. at 279.
49 Id. at 282-85.
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preservation of human life, and there can be no gainsaying this
interest. . . .
But in the context presented here, a State has more particular
interests at stake. The choice between life and death is a deeply
personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality. We believe
Missouri may legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of
this choice through the imposition of heightened evidentiary
requirements.50
In Cruzan, the Supreme Court recognized that the choice to
refuse medical treatment is deeply personal, but it affirmed the clear
and convincing evidence standard based on its recognition of the risks
involved in surrogate decision-making.51  The Court reasoned that an
erroneous decision to continue care results in maintaining the status
quo, yet an erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
would be a mistake that cannot be corrected.52  The Supreme Court’s
decision thus bolstered individual autonomy by opening the door to
considering that the right to refuse treatment is encompassed in the
constitutional right of privacy; yet it decided that only clear and con-
vincing evidence could substantiate the choice to exercise that right.53
Immediately after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cruzan,
Congress sought to reduce the problems associated with terminating
life-sustaining treatment by mandating increased communication
between patients and their health care providers.54 It passed the
Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, requiring health care prov-
iders to give information to patients regarding advance medical direc-
tives, institutional protocols, and current state laws.55 The
requirement of increased communication between patients and med-
ical professionals was meant to avoid potential ambiguity so that the
exercise of patients’ rights would not be limited.  The Act also was
seen by Congress as an attempt to bolster the rights of patients in
health care decision-making. During a Senate finance subcommittee
meeting, U.S. Representative Sander M. Levin, who sponsored the
bill, outlined the bill’s importance:
As I see it, this bill is about empowerment, not empowerment
of the State, but empowerment of the individual. Without knowl-
50 Id. at 280-81.
51 Id. at 281.
52 Id. at 283.
53 Id. at 284.
54 Michael A. Salatka, The Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990: Issues Regarding the
Facilitation of Advance Directives, Patient Autonomy, Assisted Suicide, and Euthanasia, 1 J.
PHARMACY & L. 155, 155-56 (1992).
55 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation (Patient Self-Determination) Act, 42 U.S.C
§ 1395cc (f) (2012).
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edge there is no power. And what this bill in the Senate and in the
House attempts to do is capacitate people in terms of periods of
incapacitation by providing them knowledge, informing them, and
making certain that their wishes are noted in a useful way on the
record.56
The Act was also meant to provide greater autonomy to incompe-
tent patients by providing statutory affirmation to the common law
right to refuse treatment.57
Today, every state has advance directive legislation of one kind or
another,58 which provides for the ability of patients to execute either a
living will, an appointment of a health care proxy, or a combination of
both.59  New York does not have a living will statute but it does have
the Health Care Proxy law.60  Despite the absence of a living will
statute, New York’s courts have consistently upheld the right of an
adult to forego medical treatment when there is evidence that the
individual demonstrated this intent when he or she had capacity to
make decisions.61  Advance directive statutes are not meant to replace
the legitimacy of advance directives under the common law,62 yet the
requirements of a state’s statute at times ends up limiting the common
law legitimacy of advance directives.63
56 Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advance Directives: A History
and Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 249, 256-
57 (1997).
57 RONALD W. SCOTT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOCUMENTING PATIENT CARE FOR
REHABILITATION PROFESSIONALS, 137 (3d ed. 2006).
58 Even though advance directives can be used to dictate the administration of
treatment to incompetent patients as well, this article focuses primarily on their use as a
means to forego treatment. With the exception of statutes permitting the appointment of a
health care agent, most medical advance directive statutes limit the use of advance
directives to end-of-life decision-making by making them applicable only to patients who
are terminally ill or in persistent vegetative states.
59 Statutory advance directives are written statements made by patients that accord
with the state statute; however, the law also recognizes oral declarations and written
documents that do not completely accord to state statute as either a valid advance directive
or as an indication of the wishes of the patient.
60 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980-2994 (McKinney 2014). While New York does not
have a statute governing living wills, in O’Connor, the New York Court of Appeals
recognized the validity of living wills so long as they provide “clear and convincing”
evidence of the individual’s wishes. In re O’Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613-14 (N.Y. 1988).
See footnote 6 for an explanation of the difference between a living will and a proxy
directive.
61 O’Connor at 531 N.E.2d at 613-614.
62 Camp v. White, 510 So.2d 166, 169-170 (Ala. 1987); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225
Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
63 In Ross v. Hilltop Rehab. Hosp. the court wrote, “Plaintiff asserts this case involves
the “relatively straightforward legal question: Without court authorization, may a hospital
or treating physician unilaterally override the medical treatment decisions made by a
competent and informed patient?” (Plaintiff’s memorandum in support of motion, p. 1.)
We disagree. The legal issues involved in this case are far more complicated than posited
13
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THE STATE’S INTEREST OF PROTECTING THE AUTONOMY
OF THE INDIVIDUAL
Although courts recognize the right to forgo life-sustaining treat-
ment, it is not considered an absolute right.  Rather, when courts
weigh the legitimacy of a decision to forgo life-saving treatment,
patients’ rights are balanced against certain state interests.64  These
interests, however, are considered only when there is ambiguity as to
what an incompetent patient wishes.65  Therefore, it would be more
accurate to say that, when a patient’s wishes are unclear, giving effect
to those wishes is limited by the considerations that are presumed the
individual would have.  These presumptions are then weighed against
the individual’s statement(s) to infer what his or her autonomous
choice would be if competent.  This process is similar to the way in
which the courts demarcate the boundaries of proxy decision-making,
since in both cases it is a matter of putting another in the patient’s
place.
The state interests which the courts usually consider are: (1) pres-
ervation of life; (2) prevention of suicide; (3) protection of third par-
ties; and (4) the ethical integrity of the medical profession.66  While
the first two interests are meant to protect the patient’s autonomy, the
latter two are meant to protect the autonomy of the patient’s depen-
dents and the physician.  The general position with which the courts
begin analysis is that individual interests are given priority over state
interests in end-of-life cases.67  However, if the state has a compelling
by plaintiff. The causes of action before us involve claims under Section 1983 and the
Rehabilitation Act. Resolution of these claims involves determining the liability of a
medical facility and physician under Section 1983 and the Rehabilitation Act for treating a
patient who has requested termination of medical treatment when they have serious
doubts as to the patient’s mental capacity.” Ross v. Hilltop Rehab. Hosp., 676 F.Supp.
1528, 1530 (D. Colo 1987).
64 Gray v. Romeo, 697 F.Supp. 580, 588 (D. R.I. 1988); see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
65 Woods v. Kentucky, 142 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2004).
66 Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass.
1977). Another state interest is in the charitable and humane care of a patient. See McKay
v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 621 (Nev. 1990). Courts have also addressed state interests that
may affect a patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, including relevant state
interests when the patient is a prisoner. Such interests include the preservation of internal
order and discipline, the maintenance of institutional security, and the rehabilitation of
prisoners. Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.3d 452, 457 (Mass. 1979); Thor v.
Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 369-70 (Cal. 1993). When refusal is a form of protest or an
attempt to manipulate the system, the state interest will override patient autonomy.
Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.3d at 454, 457-58. When refusal is a sincere
expression of a patient’s right to bodily integrity, then the prisoner’s right to refuse
treatment will prevail.
67 See footnote 18.
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interest to override the expressed interests of the individual, then he
or she will not be allowed to refuse treatment.68   When a patient is
competent, on the other hand, his or her right to forgo life-sustaining
treatment overrides state interests to the contrary, regardless of prog-
nosis, yet it may still be limited by the state interest in protecting third
parties.69
The state interest of preservation of life encompasses two sepa-
rate but related concerns, namely, an interest in preserving the life of
the particular patient and an interest in preserving the sanctity of life
in general.70 It is the most significant of the four state interests that
the courts use to balance against an individual’s right to refuse treat-
ment.71  The Missouri Supreme Court held in Cruzan that the state’s
68 This was not always the case. In Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court marked the
balance and the underlying presumption as follows: “We think that the State’s interest
Contra weakens and the individual’s right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual’s
rights overcome the State interest.” In re Quinlan, 355 A2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976). Because
her prognosis was very poor and the bodily invasion required was great, the court
recognized her right to withdraw treatment. Id. The implication is that the State’s interests
are primary and only when they weaken does the right of privacy grow. If the balance
between prognosis and bodily invasion shifted, the state interest in preserving life might
have overridden her right to refuse treatment.
69 See Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So.2d 96, 97-98 (Fla. 1989) (It appears that,
generally speaking, the courts have held that a fully competent adult patient may refuse on
religious or other grounds to receive a lifesaving blood transfusion, even where the patient
has minor children whom he supports, so long as these children will be adequately cared
for in the event the patient dies. This result is, of course, different where the patient is not
competent because of her medical condition to make a decision on the matter and is the
mother of a minor child, or where the refusal to administer the blood transfusion would
result in the death of the patient’s unborn child, or where the minor children involved
would be abandoned in the event of the patient’s death.) See also Winthrop Univ. Hosp.,
490 N.Y.S. 2d 996, 997 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) quoting In re President & Dirs. Georgetown
Coll, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964) “The State, as parens patriae, will not allow
a parent to abandon a child, and so it should not allow this most ultimate of voluntary
abandonments. The patient has a responsibility to the community to care for her infant.
Thus the People have an interest in preserving the life of a mother.” This does not include
complicated questions where pregnant women are refusing treatment. Those questions
include an additional question over the status of the fetus. In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451
(N.J. 1987); Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 387 (Cal. 1993); Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304-05 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541
So.2d 96, 97-98 (Fla. 1989); St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So.2d 666, 667-69 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985); Harrel v. St Mary’s Hosp., 678 So.2d 455, 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
Shine v. Vega, 709 N.E.2d 58, 63-65 (Mass. 1999); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev.
1990); Fosmire v. Nicoleau; 552 N.E.2d 77, 80-84 (N.Y. 1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209,
1222-26 (N.J. 1985); In re Browning, 568 So.2d 4, 11-14 (Fla. 1990).
70 In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985).
71 In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985); Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541
So.2d 96, 100 (Fla. 1989); Delio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 691
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
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interest in preservation of life does not entail a judgment about the
quality of an individual’s life. It stated,
[I]t is tempting to equate the state’s interest in the preservation of
life with some measure of quality of life. . . . some courts find quality
of life a convenient focus when justifying the termination of treat-
ment. But the state’s interest is not in quality of life. The broad
policy statements of the legislature make no such distinction; nor
shall we. Were quality of life at issue, persons with all manner of
handicaps might find the state seeking to terminate their lives.
Instead, the state’s interest is in life; that interest is unqualified.72
The state’s interest in the sanctity of life, as the statement above
attests, serves to protect individuals from being coerced into termi-
nating treatment.  Quality of life, however, oftentimes does become a
factor, albeit under a different name, as when courts consider patients
in permanent vegetative states or who have hopeless prognoses.73
When the patient’s condition is incurable or the patient’s life is near
its natural end, the state’s interest to preserve life greatly diminishes.
In such situations courts distinguish between evaluating quality of life
and the diminishing state interest in preserving life in light of the
patient’s condition. Courts can view the invasiveness of the treatment
as so extraordinary that it should be overridden in favor of the
patient’s interest in refusing care.74  The Missouri Supreme Court in
72 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 420 (Mo. 1988).
73 Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (1989) §11 (a); In re Gordy, 658 A.2d 613,
618-19 (Del. Ch. 1994); Woods v. Kentucky, 142 S.W.3d 24, 50-51 (Ky. 2004); Norwood
Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017, 1023 (Mass 1991); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617,
621-25 (Nev. 1990); Ragona v. Preate, 6 Pa. D. & C.4th 202, 214-15 (Pa. Lackawana County
Ct. 1990); In re Ingram, 689 P.2d 1363, 1371-72 (Wash. 1984); Newmark v. Williams, 588
A.2d 1108, 1117 -20 (Del. 1991); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d
921, 924 (Fla. 1984); Barber v Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 492-93 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983).
74 In re Quinlan, 355 A2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (A person has a right of privacy grounded in
the Federal Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, to terminate treatment. Recognizing
that this right is not absolute, however, courts balance it against asserted state interests.
The state’s interest weakens and the individual’s right to privacy grows as the degree of
bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health,
497 U.S. 261 (1990); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981) (The court has the power,
upon request of a duly appointed committee, to order termination of extraordinary life-
sustaining treatments being administered to a person whose affliction has rendered him
permanently comatose and, therefore, unable to make an intelligent and articulate choice
with respect to continuation of the treatments.); Woods v. Kentucky, 142 S.W.3d 24 (Ky.
2004) (The explicit wishes of an incompetent patient regarding extraordinary life-
prolonging treatment should be respected if expressed, while competent. Wishes expressed
in a written document, i.e., a living will, provide the clearest evidence of a person’s desire.
A patient’s own written declaration or designation of proxy creates a rebuttable
presumption of a patient’s wishes. A living will is persuasive evidence of an incompetent
patient’s intent and is entitled to great weight. A living will is one of several types of
evidence of person’s wishes against extraordinary life-sustaining treatment. It is reasonable
16
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Cruzan added, “[t]his focus on the extraordinary/ordinary dichotomy
provided a ready standard by which the patient’s interest could be
assessed in a constitutional sense against the state’s interest in life.”75
The reliance on the distinction between extraordinary and ordi-
nary care has its origin in Catholic moral theology.76  According to the
traditional understanding of the dichotomy, ordinary care is always
morally obligatory. Because of the potential burden to the patient
and/or the community, extraordinary care is not morally obligatory.
However, the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary treat-
ment has changed since Cruzan, corresponding to the increase in the
priority of individual autonomy.
The U.S. President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Behavioral Research currently defines
extraordinary treatment as that which, in the patient’s view, entails
significantly greater burdens than benefits and is therefore undesir-
able.77 Ordinary treatment is that which, in the patient’s view, pro-
duces greater benefits than burdens, making it reasonable and thus
morally required.78  These definitions remove the burden of deter-
mining whether care is ordinary or extraordinary from the physician
or from society and place it on the patient.  The result, however, is
that the definitions have become subjective and without common
meaning across society.  Since today the state no longer has a societal
definition with which to balance the two sides, the weight of the right
to refuse treatment will be even greater vis-a`-vis state interest to pre-
serve life.
When the patient’s condition is curable or the patient is not ter-
minally ill, the weight of the state’s interest to preserve life increases.
For example, in Mack v. Mack, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that nutrition and hydration could not be withheld from a patient
for courts to employ a rebuttable presumption that a living will represents a competent
individual’s informed preferences. Unequivocal oral statements also carry great weight.
Such statements are admissible under Ky. R. Evid. 803(3), the state-of-mind exception to
the hearsay rule, because the statement relates to future intent, not to a fact remembered.)
75 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 421 (Mo. 1988).
76 Nutrition and Hydration: Moral Considerations: A Statement of the Catholic Bishops
of Pennsylvania (Revised 1999), PENNSYLVANIA CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, http://
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/
opinion2191.page (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
77 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. &
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT
DECISIONS 88 (Mar. 1983) http://kie.georgetown.edu/nrcbl/documents/pcemr/
decidingtoforego-tx.pdf.
78 Id.
17
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in a persistent vegetative state who was not terminally ill.79  The court
concluded its decision:
[U]nless and until current public policy, as we perceive it, is changed
by the General Assembly, sustaining Ronald [Mack] and other per-
sons like him, whose desires concerning the withdrawal of artificial
sustenance cannot clearly be determined, is a price paid for the ben-
efit of living in a society that highly values human life.80
Yet this statement must be read against the backdrop of the con-
flicting and non-definitive testimony of what Ronald W. Mack had
stated eight years before.81  Therefore, evidence of his wishes were
inconclusive and ambiguous.82
Though courts mention prevention of suicide as a state interest,83
it is oftentimes summarily dismissed since the courts do not consider
forgoing treatment to be suicide.84  Courts reason that a patient who
desires to terminate treatment does not want to kill himself or her-
self;85 rather, the desire is only to avoid the suffering or indignity of
living on life-sustaining equipment,86 even if death is an ultimate
consequence.87
79 Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 746 (Md. 1993). There is no ethical or legal difference
between withdrawing or withholding a medical therapy, which includes mechanical
ventilation, renal dialysis, chemotherapy, antibiotics, and artificial nutrition and hydration.
80 Id. at 761.
81 Id. at 748.
82 Id. at 748.
83 Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass.
1977). Though committing suicide and attempted suicide is no longer treated as a crime in
common law, many jurisdictions still have anti-suicide legislation as well as statutes making
the providing to another of the means for taking one’s own life a crime.  There are also
statutes prohibiting causing or inciting another to commit suicide.
84 Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); In re Farell, 529
A.2d 404, 411 (N.J. 1987); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225-26 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984); McConnell v. Beverly Enters-Conn., 553 A.2d 596, 605, 608-09 (Conn. 1989);
In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 955-56 (Me. 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc.,
497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (Mass. 1986); Eichner v. Dillon, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 544 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980); Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 68 Ohio Misc.1, 10 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1980);
Ragona v. Preate, 6 Pa. D. & C.4th 202, 215 (Pa. Lackawana County Ct. 1990); In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985); see Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
(1989).
85 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801-06 (1997); Washington v Glucksberg, 512 U.S. 702
(U.S. 1997); Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209
Cal. Rptr. 220, 225-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); McConnell v. Beverly Enters-Conn., 553 A.2d
596, 608-09 (Conn. 1989); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 955-56 (Me. 1987); In re Conroy,
486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626,
638 (Mass. 1986).
86 Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375, 385 (Cal. 1993); Foody v. Manchester Memo-
rial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 720 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617,
625-27 (Nev. 1990).
87 In re Quinlan, 355 A2d 647 (N.J. 1976); Donaldson v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr.2d 59
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992); McKenzie v. Doctors’ Hosp. of Hollywood, 765 F.Supp. 1504 (S.D.Fl.
18
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This semantic shift is important because it allows the court to rely
on the moral principle of double effect.  The principle of double effect
was originally developed by natural law theorists, and posits that a
person may perform an act that has the potential for evil if the fol-
lowing four conditions are met: (a) the nature of the act is itself good,
or at least morally neutral; (b) the agent intends the good effect and
not the bad; (c) the bad is not a means to the good; (d) the good effect
outweighs the bad effect in circumstances sufficiently grave to justify
causing the bad effect and the agent exercises due diligence to mini-
mize the harm.  The principle allows for an act to be considered moral
based on the intentions of the actor, even if its moral benefit would be
less clear if viewed from a consequentialist perspective.  The courts’
reliance on the moral principle of double effect is further demon-
strated by the fact that removal of a respirator without consent is
treated as homicide.88  Moreover, most, if not all, advance directive
statutes specifically provide that the death of a patient refusing life-
sustaining treatment in conformity with an advance directive does not
constitute suicide or homicide.89 The state’s interest in preventing sui-
cide includes an interest in avoiding undue influence for suicide and
euthanasia.90
1991); Deel v. Syracuse Veteran’s Admin. Med. Ctr., 729 F.Supp. 231, 232 (N.D.N.Y. 1990);
McConnell v. Beverly Enters-Conn., 553 A.2d 596, 605 (Conn. 1989); Krischer v McIver,
697 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1997); Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass 1991); In re
Doe 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992); but see Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
88 Alan Meisel, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Common Law Roadmap for State Courts,
24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817, 846–48 (1997); David Orentlicher, The Legalization of
Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Very Modest Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REV. 443, 447–48 (1997).
89 NANCY M. P. KING, supra note 18, at 59-60 (rev. ed. 1996); See also In re Colyer, 660
P.2d 738, 751 (Wash. 1983) (The withdrawal of life sustaining treatment from an incurably
ill patient does not constitute homicide if it is accomplished in good faith compliance with
judicially imposed safeguards).
90 In Sanderson v. People, 12 P.3D 851, 852 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000), the plaintiff wanted
to execute an advance directive authorizing his wife to end his life in the event that his
medical condition was hopeless, and he sought a declaratory judgment to assure that
neither his wife nor the physician would be subject to criminal liability if they acted in
accordance with the advance directive. The court ruled that the prohibition against
euthanasia overrode the ability to rely on the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has also demonstrated an inclination towards preserving life over that
of respecting individual autonomy in several decisions addressing physician-assisted
suicide. For example, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the court stated that when the
underlying reason for a person’s desire to commit suicide is depression, treatment of the
depression would be a better remedy than suicide. Washington v Glucksberg, 512 U.S. 702,
730-31 (1997). In effect, the court adopted the position of the medical community that the
desire to commit suicide is often caused by a  mental illness such that the physician has a
duty to heal the person under implied consent. Id. at 730. In Sampson v. State, the
Supreme Court of Alaska held that, while the statute prohibiting assisted suicide interfered
with a person’s liberty as guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution, it nevertheless served a
19
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The interest in protecting third parties is usually relevant when
there are interests of minor children who might incur emotional or
financial loss if a parent refuses treatment. The courts will also give
greater weight to state interests if a patient’s prognosis is good and
overriding the advance directive would prevent minors from
becoming wards of the state.91  This interest might be employed even
when the parent is competent.92  For example, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey stated, “[w]hen the patient’s exercise of his free choice
could adversely and directly affect the health, safety, or security of
others, the patient’s right of self-determination must frequently give
way.”93  This interest is based on the idea of individual liberty attrib-
uted to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. but penned by Zechariah Chafee,
“[y]our right to swing your arms ends just where the other man’s nose
begins.”94  It also is grounded in the principle of parens patriae, i.e. the
state’s obligation to intervene and to act as the parent of any child or
individual who is in need of protection.
The state interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the health
professions is meant to defend the choice of a medical professional to
act based on his or her profession’s ethos and standards.  While main-
taining the ethical integrity of the health professions had been a strong
state interest and was pitted against an individual patient’s right to
refuse treatment in the early end-of-life cases, it is the least influential
interest of the four state interests that courts usually consider,95 and it
has continued to be significantly weakened.96  Its decline in promi-
legitimate governmental purpose. Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 95-96 (Alaska 2001).
Moreover, if the court permitted assisted suicide for competent patients, it might provide
an opening to allow it for incompetent patients who have an advance directive. Id.
91 In re Dubreuil, 603 So. 2d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (The Court authorized a
hospital and its attending physicians to perform blood transfusions on petitioner’s mother,
notwithstanding that she was a Jehovah’s Witness and had refused the transfusions. The
District Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision because the state’s interest in protecting
her four minor children from abandonment in the event of her death outweighed her
wishes. However, the Supreme Court of Florida in a 5:2 decision overruled the District
Court’s decision. In re Dubreuil 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993). The Hospital on behalf of the
state failed to satisfy the heavy burden required to override the patient’s constitutional
right to refuse medical treatment).
92 In re President of Georgetown Coll. Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1977).
93 In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (N.J. 1985).
94 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in Wartime, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957
(1919).
95 In re Browning, 568 So.2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr.
297, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
96 Though, it is still used in its consideration of physician assisted suicide. In
Washington v. Glucksberg, the court cited the American Medical Association’s (“AMA”)
language: ““[p]hysician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s
role as healer.” American Medical Association, Code of Ethics § 2.211 (1994).”
20
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nence, however, is not a result of the courts’ reprioritizing the
autonomy of the individual patient over that of the medical profes-
sional.  Rather, it is due to the changing ethics of the medical profes-
sion itself. Ethical standards have migrated, from being paternalistic
and valuing sustaining the life of a patient over all else, to one that
balances the value of sustaining life with the value of deferring to the
preferences of a patient.97  For example, courts have cited the Amer-
ican Medical Association’s Code of Ethics to justify a changing stance
on the ethical integrity of the profession vis-a`-vis withholding and
withdrawing treatment.98  As the medical profession is part of the
greater society, the shift in medical ethics reflects the broader shift in
civil society’s values to prioritizing individual autonomy over the sanc-
tity of life and its move away from moral theology to a more secular-
ized medical ethics.
The courts also take account of the conscientious objection of
individual medical professionals or institutions.99  Inclusion of consci-
entious objection in maintaining the ethics of the profession is based
on a physician’s permission to act within the realm of conscience when
Washington v Glucksberg, 512 U.S. 702, 731 (1997). Similarly, in Vacco v. Quill, the court
cited the AMA position on physician-assisted suicide to distinguish it from the withholding
and withdrawing of treatment. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 n.6 (1997).
97 In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743-44, 749-50 (Wash. 1983).
98 AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 2.20 – Withholding or Withdrawing Life-
Sustaining Medical Treatment, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion220.page? (last visited Mar
1, 2016). The opinion was issued in 1984. See In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60
(Wis. 1992) “The state’s interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession is not
implicated in this case. . . . Their [L.W.’s physicians] actions were consistent with current
medical ethics in so far as approval was sought and given by the Bioethics Committee of
Franciscan Health System. Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
of the American Medical Association 2.18, ‘Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Prolonging
Medical Treatment’ (1986); Position of the American Academy of Neurology on Certain
Aspects of the Care and Management of the Persistent Vegetative State Patient, 39
Neurology 125 (1989). Thus a decision to withhold or withdraw treatment will not impugn
the integrity of the profession. Indeed, the existence of a protected right to refuse
treatment for all individuals competent or incompetent may in a sense protect the integrity
of the medical profession. In the absence of such a protected right, physicians may be
discouraged from attempting certain life-sustaining medical procedures in the first place,
knowing that once connected they may never be removed. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 370, 486 A.2d
at 1234. The existence of this right will prevent premature and rash decisions to allow a
patient to die, and will remove the potential conflict for the medical profession between
ordinary compassion and the Hippocratic Oath.” Id. at 91. See also Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988); Woods v. Kentucky, 142 S.W.3d 24, 50-51 (Ky. 2004); In re Estate
of Prange, 166 Ill. App. 3d 1091 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (judgment in the case was vacated and
the opinion was withdrawn by order of the Illinois Supreme Court.).
99 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 639-40 (Mass. 1986); Gray
v. Romeo, 697 F.Supp. 580, 590-91 (D. R.I. 1988); In re Morrison v. Abramovice, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 530, 534-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); In re Requena, 517 A.2d 886 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1986).
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personal views differ from that of patients.100  In these cases, courts
have tried to accommodate the conflicting views of patients and
health care providers by requiring the patient to be transferred to
another facility, rather than by forcing the health care provider to act
against his or her conscience.101 However, in a few cases medical pro-
fessionals have been required to comply with the patient’s wishes
when no other facility for transfer was available.102  This accommoda-
tion, however, is not unique to the courts; most advance directive stat-
utes recognize the right of health care providers not to comply with
patients’ wishes due to conscience, yet all note that reasonable efforts
must be made to find a transfer facility.103
SURROGATE DECISION-MAKING & PROXY DIRECTIVES
Even though the common law confers on all patients the right to
make their own health care decisions, originally surrogates could only
act on behalf of incompetent patients when there was clear and con-
vincing evidence of their wishes from before he or she became incom-
petent.104  The authority of surrogates has expanded over time, either
by statute or judicial interpretation.105  Today, since there is no uni-
form national standard, a surrogate’s decisional authority is deter-
mined by the prevailing standard in the given state.106 Each standard
of surrogate decision-making rests on a balance between patient
autonomy and the risk of violating that autonomy.
The most stringent standard is the demand that the surrogate
have express knowledge of the patient’s actual wishes; this is called
100 Lois Snyder, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual: Sixth Edition, 156
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 73, 82 (2012).
101 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 639-40 (Mass. 1986).
Indiana even allows for refusal not based on conscience; see Illinois 745 ILCS 70/1-14). See
also Patient Self-Determination Act 42 USCA 139(w)(3).
102 In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (N.J. 1987).
103 ROBERT POWELL CTR. FOR MED. ETHICS, WILL YOUR ADVANCE DIRECTIVE BE
FOLLOWED? 8 (rev. ed. 2015), http://www.nrlc.org/uploads/medethics/WillYourAdvance
DirectiveBeFollowed.pdf. See above for individual state statutes regarding the
requirement of making reasonable effort to find a transfer facility. Id. at A1 – A18.
104 Carol Ann Colabrese, In re Storar: The Right to Die and Incompetent Patients, 43 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1087 (1981).
105 Some state statutes prohibit a proxy from withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment under certain conditions (Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Tennessee, West Virginia),
and others limit a proxy’s authority to make decisions (Delaware, Georgia, Illinois,
Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Virgina, West Virginia).
106 Cathaleen A. Roach, Paradox and Pandora’s Box: The Tragedy of Current Right-to-
Die Jurisprudence, 25 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 133, 135-36 (1991); Roach argues for
uniformity among state laws. Id. at 136.
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the subjective standard.107  This was the sole standard adopted in 1998
by the New York Court of Appeals108 before the New York Family
Health Care Decisions Act of 2010.109 If that standard is not met, life-
sustaining treatment must be continued.110  The New York Court of
Appeals insisted on this standard despite the possibility that the
patient might have changed his or her mind without articulating the
change.111 Without such a “clear expression of a present intention to
forego treatment,” withdrawal cannot be granted.  In In re O’Connor,
the New York Court of Appeals articulated the standard as follows:
But the existence of these problems does not lead inevitably to
the conclusion that we should abandon the inquiry entirely and
adopt as guideposts the objective factors used in the so-called “sub-
stituted judgment” approach. That approach remains unacceptable
because it is inconsistent with our fundamental commitment to the
notion that no person or court should substitute its judgment as to
what would be an acceptable quality of life for another. Conse-
quently, we adhere to the view that, despite its pitfalls and inevi-
table uncertainties, the inquiry must always be narrowed to the
patient’s expressed intent, with every effort made to minimize the
opportunity for error.
Every person has a right to life, and no one should be denied
essential medical care unless the evidence clearly and convincingly
shows that the patient intended to decline the treatment under
some particular circumstances. This is a demanding standard, the
most rigorous burden of proof in civil cases. It is appropriate here
because if an error occurs it should be made on the side of life.112
Besides New York, state courts that required this high standard in
certain end-of-life cases, include California,113 Michigan,114 and Wis-
107 RAYMOND J. DEVETTERE, PRACTICAL DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE ETHICS:
CASES AND CONCEPTS 211 (3d ed. 2010).
108 In re Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988); In re Univ.
Hosp. of the State Univ. of N.Y. Upstate Med. Univ., 754 N.Y.S.2d 153, 157-58 (Sup. Ct.
2002); In re Eichner, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 546-47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
109 N.Y. Public Health Law § 2994-d (McKinney 2011) (eliminating the clear and
convincing standard for clinically appropriate end-of-life decisions). Under the statute, a
surrogate makes decisions based on the patient’s wishes “if reasonably known” or else
based on statutory criteria.
110 Because this standard demands that express preferences be relevant to the particular
situation at hand, advance directives which provide general instruction or which do not
address the particular circumstances may not be implementable. (See In re Westchester
Cnty. Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988); In re Univ. Hosp. of the State Univ. of
N.Y. Upstate Med. Univ., 754 N.Y.S.2d 153, 157-58 (Sup. Ct. 2002); In re Eichner, 426
N.Y.S.2d 517, 546-47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)).
111 In re Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d at 613 (N.Y. 1988).
112 Id. (citations omitted).
113 In re Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 154 (Cal. 2001) (withhold artificial nutrition and
hydration from a conscious conservatee who is not terminally ill, comatose, or in a
23
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consin.115 In the cases where these states held to this standard, how-
ever, the question of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment related to patients who were neither terminally ill nor in a
permanent vegetative state.  Missouri held to this standard in Cruzan,
yet has subsequently adopted a substituted judgment standard.116
While virtually all courts recognize that the subjective standard is the
ideal, many courts will consider less demanding standards when neces-
sary, such as when a patient has not made his or her preferences clear
either through an advance directive or to a proxy.117
As distinguished from the subjective standard, the substituted
judgment standard is the predominant standard for making end-of-life
decisions for incompetent patients.118  It was first used as a way to
exercise the right of self-determination for an incompetent patient in
the Quinlan case, where the court stated that “the only practical way
to prevent destruction of the right [to terminate treatment] is to
permit the guardian and family of Karen to render their best judg-
ment. . .as to whether she would exercise it in these circumstances.”119
What constitutes substituted judgment varies, from demanding the
surrogate infer the patient’s actual wishes120 to demanding that he or
she infer the patient’s probable wishes.121  In attempting to apply the
patient’s inferred wishes, the courts have also included other factors
persistent vegetative state, and who has not left formal instructions for health care or
appointed an agent or surrogate for health care decisions).
114 In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Mich. 1995) (whether life-sustaining treatment in
the form of a gastrostomy tube that provides nutritive support should be removed from a
conscious patient who is not terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state, but who
suffers from a mixture of cognitive function and communication impairments that make it
impossible to evaluate the extent of his cognitive deficits).
115 In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 486 (Wis. 1997).
116 In re Warren, 858 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
117 In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299-300 (Ill. 1989) (Under substituted
judgment, a surrogate decision-maker attempts to establish, with as much accuracy as
possible, what decision the patient would make if he were competent to do so. Employing
this theory, the surrogate first tries to determine if the patient had expressed explicit intent
regarding this type of medical treatment prior to becoming incompetent. Where no clear
intent exists, the patient’s personal value system must guide the surrogate).
118 Mark R. Tonelli, Substituted Judgment in Medical Practice: Evidentiary Standards on
a Sliding Scale, 25 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 22 (1997).
119 In re Quinlan, 355 A2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976).
120 Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-32
(Mass. 1977).
121 In re Tavel, 661 A.2d, 1061, 1070 (Del. 1995); In re Howe, No. 03 P 1255, 2004 WL
1446057 at *19-21 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct. Dep’t Mar. 22, 2004); The approach has been
expanded to include incompetent patients who have never been competent, as was the case
when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Superintendent of Belchertown State
School applied the standard to a severely mentally retarded individual. Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 430-32 (Mass. 1977); but see Steven M.
Richard, Someone Make Up My Mind: The Troubling Right to Die Issues Presented by
24
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that should be considered.  The additional factors include the patient’s
age, the probable side effects of treatment, the chance of producing a
cure, the likelihood that treatment will cause suffering, the patient’s
ability to cooperate with the treatment, the patient’s reactions when
others in similar situations have received medical treatment, the
patient’s religious beliefs, the patient’s previous conduct, family opin-
ions or sentiments, the life expectancy of patient with or without treat-
ment, the patient’s mental and physical disability, the quality of life of
the patient with or without treatment, and the views of the physi-
cian.122  The Supreme Court of New Jersey, explained,
[u]nder the substituted judgment doctrine, where an incompetent’s
wishes are not clearly expressed, a surrogate decisionmaker con-
siders the patient’s personal value system for guidance. The surro-
gate considers the patient’s prior statements about and reactions to
medical issues, and all the facets of the patient’s personality that the
surrogate is familiar with, of course, particular reference to his or
her relevant philosophical, theological, and ethical values — in
order to extrapolate what course of medical treatment the patient
would choose.123
These additional factors should be included when implementing sub-
stituted judgment because individuals are influenced by their familial,
religious, and social surroundings.  Therefore, the individual’s state-
ments should be interpreted in light of his or her background.
Through the substituted judgment standard, the surrogate
attempts to implement the patient’s wishes as would be determined if
he or she were competent to decide.  Through the best interests stan-
dard, on the other hand, the patient’s best interests are based on
objective criteria and not on what the surrogate believes to be the
wishes of the patient.124  With respect to refusal of life-sustaining care,
the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Conroy was the first to articu-
late what constitutes the best interests standard.  The court provided
for two “best interests” tests, i.e. a limited-objective and a pure-objec-
tive test.
Under the limited-objective test, life-sustaining treatment may
be withheld or withdrawn from a patient in Claire Conroy’s situa-
tion when there is some trustworthy evidence that the patient would
have refused the treatment, and the decision-maker is satisfied that
Incompetent Patients with No Prior Expression of a Treatment Preference, 64 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 394 (1989).
122 MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 36, at 4-21 - 4-25.
123 In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (N.J. 1987) (footnote omitted).
124 Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best-Interests Standard as Threshold, Ideal, and Standard
of Reasonableness, 22.3 J. MED. & PHIL. 271, 277-78 (1997).
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it is clear that the burdens of the patient’s continued life with the
treatment outweigh the benefits of that life for him.
In the absence of trustworthy evidence, or indeed any evidence
at all, that the patient would have declined the treatment, life-sus-
taining treatment may still be withheld or withdrawn from a for-
merly competent person like Claire Conroy if a third, pure-
objective test is satisfied. Under that test, as under the limited-
objective test, the net burdens of the patient’s life with the treat-
ment should clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits that the
patient derives from life. Further, the recurring, unavoidable and
severe pain of the patient’s life with the treatment should be such
that the effect of administering life-sustaining treatment would be
inhumane. Subjective evidence that the patient would not have
wanted the treatment is not necessary under this pure-objective
standard.125
While the best interests standard plays a dominant role in medical
decision-making outside of the context of end-of-life care, it is not
very prevalent in end-of-life cases.126  The reason for its relative
absence in end-of-life cases is that it is anathema to the idea of patient
autonomy. Under a best interests standard the patient (or his or her
surrogate) does not determine what is best, but rather the state
decides based on societal standards.  Moreover, the best interest stan-
dard runs a greater risk of violating an individual’s rights, since its
application does not account for the individuality of the patient.  The
benefit of this standard attains when there is no useful indication of
the patient’s wishes or when the court believes that the patient must
be protected.127  Some courts, when faced with no information of an
incompetent patient’s preferences, have continued treatment,
presuming that the patient’s best interests are in continuing to live
rather than withdrawing treatment.128  For those courts that use the
best interests standard when there are no indications of a patient’s
preferences, the starting presumption is that continued treatment is in
the patient’s best interest.129  The presumption prevails because, even
125 In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J. 1985).
126 The best interests standard was rejected in New Jersey in favor of a substituted
judgment standard. See In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 429 (N.J. 1987); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d
434, 445-47 (N.J. 1987).
127 As such, it would apply its parens patriae power for the sake of an incompetent
patient.
128 DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Ky. 1993); Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744,
757-61 (Md. 1993); In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399, 413 (Mich. 1995); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988); In re Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y.
1988).
129 Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock argue, “[t]he proper question for such patients [in a
PVS] . . . is not ‘Would withdrawal of life support best serve the patient’s interest?’ but
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if one may argue that it is of no benefit to the patient to continue
living, there is also no burden to the patient in continuing to live
either.130  If the patient’s life would continue to be one of suffering, or
if the prognosis is dire, then the presumption may be overcome.131
PROTECTING THE ETHICS OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
Just as the courts rely on state interests to protect the patient
from enduring the consequences of a potential misrepresentation of
his or her wishes, the courts also protect medical professionals when
their actions are contrary to the assumed wishes of the patient.  Courts
grant this protection because, as the New York Court of Appeals
phrases it, the error was made on the side of life.132 Some states pro-
vide a basis for a civil cause of action within the state’s living will
statutes,133 yet violation of a statute in these cases does not automati-
cally give rise to civil liability.134  Plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in
end-of-life cases that arise from unwanted treatment, despite the fact
that the cases have been brought based on a number of statutory
claims, such as consumer protection acts,135 advance directive stat-
utes,136 surrogate decision-making statutes,137 brain death statutes,138
and unlawful practice of medicine statutes.139 This is, in part, due to
the fact that most states do not provide for penalties or damages when
rather ‘Would continued support provide any benefit?’” ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W.
BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 132
(1989); See also Rebecca Dresser, Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual
Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 373 (1986).
130 Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 759-61 (Md. 1993); In re Guardianship of LW, 482
N.W.2d 60, 75 (Wis. 1992); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 423-25 (N.J. 1987).
131 In re Guardianship of LW, 482 N.W.2d 60, 72-74 (Wis. 1992); In re AB, 768 N.Y.S.2d
256, 262, 271-72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003); In re Warren, 858 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993);
In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73 (N.Y. 1981).
132 In re Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988).
133 Saitta & Hodge, Jr., Wrongful Prolongation of Life-A Cause of Action, supra note 9.
States whose statutes mention civil or criminal liability with regards to advance directives
include Tennessee, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, Georgia, Florida, Connecticut, Arizona,
Washington, New York, Nevada, Massachusetts, Louisiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Iowa,
Colorado, Wisconsin, Rhode Island, Ohio, and Nebraska. Id. However, the statutes are
ambiguous such that they recognize the existence of advance directives while limiting the
power of their enforcement. Id. at 227-28.
134 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §874A (1977). Also, certain state statutes shift
the responsibility of disciplinary action onto the state licensing authorities.
135 Gragg v. Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282, 1288-89 (Ill. 1998); Spring v. Geriatric Auth. of
Holyoke, 475 N.E.2d 727, 735-36 (Mass. 1985); Benoy v. Simons, 831 P.2d 167, 172 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1992).
136 Wright v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 728 A.2d 166, 175-76 (Md. 1999).
137 Collins v. Lake Forrest Hosp., 821 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. 2004).
138 Law v Camp, 116 F. Supp.2d 295 (D. Conn. 2000).
139 Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F.Supp.2d 184, 196-97 (N.D.N.Y 2002).
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medical providers fail to comply with advance directives.140  It is also,
in part, because some state statutes give medical providers immunity
even when they do not comply with a patient’s advance directive if
providers use their best medical judgment when making these deci-
sions.141 The majority of states, however, confer immunity only when
medical providers comply with directives or transfer the patient to a
health care provider willing to comply.142 For those states with very
narrow statutory immunity provisions, the courts, at times, will never-
theless interpret the provisions more broadly. For example, in Stolle v.
Baylor College of Medicine, the Texas Court of Appeals interpreted
the language of “failing to effectuate a qualified patient’s directive” to
allow for the administration of “heroic efforts” to save the patient.143
The parents claimed that the physicians negligently disregarded
instructions not to use heroic efforts or artificial means to prolong the
child’s life.144 The Court’s reasoning was that if the child had been in a
terminal condition, she could be a “qualified patient” and the physi-
cians would be immune under Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
§672.016 (b).145 However, if the child was not in a terminal condition,
then the condition for withholding life-sustaining procedures con-
tained in the “Directive to Physicians” was not met.146 In effect, either
way one looks at the case, the physicians had immunity.
140 The exceptions are Alaska, Mississippi, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Tennessee.  Some
states provide a criminal penalty for noncompliance (Arkansas, California, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada), while others relegate disciplinary action to the licensing authorities
(Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, West
Virginia Wisconsin).
141 These statutes seem superfluous since the courts already refuse to recognize a
common law cause of action for wrongful living. Since there is no civil or criminal liability,
there is no need for the statute. See OKLA. STAT. TIT. 63, §3101.10 (B) (2015); CAL. PROB.
CODE §4740 (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. §31-32-10(a)(3)(2015); NEV. REV. STAT.
§449.640 (2015); MINN. STAT. §145C.11(c) (2015). Utah, did have a statutory penalty for
failure to comply with a living will (Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-1112 (2004)), yet it has
subsequently been repealed. Also, many living will statutes provide the option of
transferring the patient if the medical provider refuses to comply with the patient’s
advance directive. Gregory Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 WIS. L.
REV. 737, 768 (1987). This option limits statutory compulsion to comply, while also
providing the courts a mitigating circumstance so as not to impose penalties if transfer was
not possible. Id. at 769. See also Saitta & Hodge, Jr., Wrongful Prolongation of Life-A
Cause of Action, supra note 9.
142 See ABA, COMM’N ON LAW & AGING, MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT HEALTH CARE
DIRECTIVES, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Commissions/
myths_fact_hc_ad.authcheckdam.pdf.
143 Stolle v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 981 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App. 1998).
144 Id. at 710.
145 Id. at 713-14.
146 Id. See also THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 6, at 53-91.
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The California Court of Appeals ruled that a physician is granted
immunity by the provisions of an advance directive statute even when
he fails to comply with a request to forgo treatment.147  Certain states
have given greater support to patients’ rights to refuse end-of-life care
by making medical providers civilly or criminally liable for failure to
comply with patients’ wishes, yet the courts have not enforced these
penalties when noncompliance leads to prolonged life.148
In a number of cases plaintiffs have sued for damages in federal
court, alleging that the unwanted administration of treatment violated
a federally protected right, since the right to refuse treatment has
been grounded in the constitutional right to privacy.149  These cases
have been difficult to win, since the defendants, i.e. physicians and
health care institutions, were private parties acting as private citizens
and not under the color of state law.150 Moreover, for the claim to
prevail, the defendant’s actions, acting as an agent of the state, must
shock the conscience of the court.151 Similarly, if it is objectively rea-
sonable that the state official believed he or she was not violating a
patient’s rights, the doctrine of qualified immunity protects the state
official from  liability.152
Plaintiffs have also attempted to rely on common law remedies
for noncompliance with an advance directive.  Cases in which patients
seek to recover damages for receiving unwanted treatment are com-
monly known as “wrongful living” or “wrongful prolongation of life”
suits.153  These names, however, are a bit misleading, since “wrongful
living” and “wrongful prolongation of life” are not causes of action
147 Duarte v Chino Cmty. Hosp., 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 521, 524-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
148 Anderson v. St. Francis – St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996);
Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 45, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 fn. 3 (1976); Johnson v. Univ.
Hospitals of Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 3d 49, 58, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1378; Hester v. Dwivedi,
1999 Ohio App, LEXIS 595 (Ohio Ct. App., Hamilton County 1999); See also Nadia N.
Sawicki, A New Life for Wrongful Living, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 279, 290-91 (2013).
149 Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F.Supp.2d 184, 190-91 (N.D.N.Y 2002); In re Guardianship of
Chantel Nicole R., 821 N.Y.S.2d 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
150 Wassif v. North Arundel Hosp. Assoc., Inc., 582 A.2d 269 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990)
but see West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 57-58 (1988).
151 Bartling v Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360, 363-64 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986); Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 707 F. Supp. 1318 (N.D.Ga. 1989).
152 Blouin v. Spitzer, 213 F.Supp.2d 184 (N.D.N.Y 2002).
153 A. Samuel Oddi, supra note 12. “Wrongful living” as a cause of action was first
proposed by Samuel Oddi. Id. Oddi defines the wrongful living cause of action as follows:
“Whether the interfering treatment is conducted with our without due care is irrelevant,
except insofar as such treatment prolongs the life of the individual contrary to the right to
die. If the interfering treatment is made and the patient lives, then interference with the
right to die involves compensation for living. This is a ‘wrongful living’ cause of action.” Id.
at 641.
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but rather are concepts in damages.154  The reason for considering
“wrongful living” a concept in damages rather than a cause of action is
based on the notion that life is a consequence of an action whose mea-
sure might be valued; the act of prolonging a patient’s life on the other
hand would have to be either a breach of duty or battery.  For
example, the Ohio Supreme Court in Anderson, writes, “[i]n reality, a
claim of wrongful living is a damages concept, just as a claim for
‘wrongful whiplash’ or ‘wrongful broken arm,’ and must necessarily
involve an underlying claim of negligence or battery.”155  The torts
under which one may sue for receiving unwanted treatment are
assault and battery,156 intentional infliction of emotional distress,157
invasion of privacy,158 and negligence.159 Sometimes a plaintiff may
claim breach of contract.160  Each of these torts is difficult to substan-
tiate when the patient is incompetent and his or her wishes are known
only through an advance directive.  For example, the core cause of
battery is touching without valid consent, even if the treatment is ben-
eficial to the patient.161  With an incompetent patient, however,
informed consent may not be straightforward as the instruction direc-
tive162 or a proxy directive163 might be ambiguous. Even when courts
154 Anderson v. St. Francis – St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ohio 1996);
See Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., supra note 19, “Although courts have phrased their
reluctance to allow recovery under such circumstances as a rejection of the ‘cause of
action’ of wrongful living or wrongful prolongation of life, a careful reading of each court’s
analysis points instead to rejection of compensation for this particular set of damages.” Id.
at 142.
155 Anderson v. St. Francis – St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ohio 1996).
156 Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051-52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Bartling v
Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360, 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
157 Bartling v Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360, 364-65 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986); Gragg v Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282, 1289 (Ill. 1998).
158 Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1054 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
159 Benoy v Simons, 831 P.2d 167, 170 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
160 See Terry v. Red River Ctr. Corp., 862 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (La. Ct. App. 2003); In re
Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980); Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588
N.Y.S.2d 853, 854-55 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (the nursing home sued for breach of contract
after the husband refused to pay for services provided to his wife after he demanded the
nursing home stop providing nutrition and hydration to his wife).
161 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §905 cmt. b (1979); Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d
1047, 1051-52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (A physician who treats a patient without consent
commits a battery, even though the procedure is harmless or beneficial.)
162 An instruction directive (a/k/a a “living will”) is a written document that specifies
which treatments an individual does and does not want, in the case that that individual
becomes incompetent.
163 A proxy directive assigns the health-care decisions of an individual to another in the
event the individual becomes incompetent.
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recognize a battery claim, however, they are still reluctant to award
damages to patients who received life-sustaining treatment.164
Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires outrageous
conduct by the defendant, intent to cause or reckless disregard of the
probability of causing emotional distress, severe emotional suffering,
and actual and proximate causation of emotional distress.165  What
constitutes outrageous conduct is usually considered as conduct which
a reasonable member of the community would deem outrageous.166
This definition creates some difficulty, since a physician acting for the
purpose of saving a life is typically not seen as being outrageous.167
This is compounded by the general presumption that patients desire to
live, and acting under this presumption falls within the professional
standard.168
The general tort of invasion of privacy has four particular torts
within it: intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of name of likeness,
publicity given to private life, and publicity placing a person in a false
light, none of which can easily incorporate a right to refuse end-of-life
care.169 Moreover, the ability to bring an action for violation of pri-
vacy must be brought while the patient is still living.170  Plaintiffs have
brought claims for violation of privacy, whereby the right of privacy is
grounded in the constitutional right, yet plaintiffs who have made such
claims have not been overly successful in having damages awarded.171
To sue for negligence, there must be a duty, a breach of that duty,
the breach must be the cause of harm, and there must be actual dam-
ages resulting from that harm.172  In fact, it is very difficult to show
164 Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853, 860 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992). In some of the states in which the right to die is broader than in New York, it has
been held that no cause of action for battery may be maintained against a medical
professional who continues to provide treatment to a patient over the objections of the
patient’s family. Id. at 858.
165 WILLIAM P. STATSKY, ESSENTIALS OF TORTS 82 (3d ed. 2011).
166 Id.
167 Morgan v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232, 236-37 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987); but see Strachan v.
John F. Kennedy Mem’l Hosp., 538 A.2d 346, 351-52 (N.J. 1988) (though the patient was
already dead according to brain death standards); Gragg v Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282,
1289-90 (Ill. 1998).
168 In right to die cases, the plaintiff always says he or she desires to live yet just not in
the way in which he or she is living currently. While this allows for the courts to rely on
double effect, it also allows the courts the ability to be lenient in intentional infliction of
emotional distress cases.
169 MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 36, at 11-26.
170 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652I (1977).
171 Klavan v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 60 F.Supp. 2d 436, 440-41, 443-44 (E.D. Pa
1999); Ross v. Hilltop Rehab. Hosp., 676 F.Supp. 1528 (D. Colo 1987).
172 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §328A (1965); “cause of harm” encompasses
both the legal cause-in-fact and the proximate cause.
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negligence in end-of-life cases, because in the majority of jurisdictions,
the plaintiff must establish by expert testimony that the defendant
failed to uphold the professional standard173 or that there was a causal
relationship between conduct and result, which must be established
according to an objective standard.174 Also, for unconscious patients,
who have no sensation of pain or awareness, it is very difficult to
prove damages, since the patient suffers no physical or mental harm
from the treatment.175  The courts do not consider life to be a legally
compensable injury.  Moreover, though legislation has lowered the
bar for informed refusal of treatment through advance directives,176
the standard for informed refusal for incompetent patients who have
surrogates is still very high.177
Courts have also dismissed wrongful life cases by upholding the
requirements of a state statute at the expense of the common law
legitimacy of advance directives.  For example, in Wright v. Johns
Hopkins Health Systems, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that a
patient’s living will was inoperative, since there was no evidence that a
physician certified that the patient had a terminal condition as
required by the state statute.178  In reaching its conclusion, the court
wrote,
Essentially the plaintiffs urge this Court to recognize a common
law action for having administered CPR that would be viewed as
unauthorized under the evidence most favorable to the plaintiffs in
this case. . . . We shall not use our power to declare the common law
to move the line between an authorized and an unauthorized DNR
173 RICHARD E. SHANDELL ET AL., THE PREPARATION AND TRIAL OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CASES 4.02[2] (rev. ed. 2010).
174 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also Robert Gatter,
Informed Consent Law and the Forgotten Duty of Physician Inquiry, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L. J.
557 (2000).
175 Morgan v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232, (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) (“When a doctor implements
a course of treatment without obtaining the patient’s consent, he breaches his duty and is
liable to the patient for any resultant damages. Similarly, when a doctor fails to obtain the
consent of the incompetent patient’s surrogate decisionmaker, he breaches his duty to the
patient and is liable for any resultant damages. The patient, however, is the only party who
may recover for the breach since the duty is owed to the patient and not the surrogate
decisionmaker or the patient’s family.”) Id. at 236 (citations omitted).
176 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§2133.01-15 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§1337.11–17
(2015).
177 Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (A patient has the right to
refuse treatment, and that this refusal may not be overcome by the doctrine of implied
consent. Before this refusal can controvert the implied consent of a medical emergency,
however, it must satisfy the same standards of knowledge and understanding required for
informed consent.).
178 Wright v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 728 A.2d 166, 175 (Md. 1999) was
superseded by statute Health Care Decisions Act 2000 Md. Laws 152, MD. Code Ann,
Health-Gen, § 5-608, recognized in Plein v. Dep’t of Labor, 800 A.2d 757 (Md. 2002).
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further from the statutory, oral advance directive than the type of
DNR order that we have recognized above as authorized.179
Other courts have held that, since plaintiffs could seek ex ante
injunctive relief, there is no need to award ex post recovery of dam-
ages when they did not seek such relief.180  Some courts are also reluc-
tant to award damages when the patient’s refusal of care was too far
removed or in a different context than the situation which was the
basis of the claim.181
Even though the courts do not consider “wrongful life” to create
a harm that leads to  damages,182 plaintiffs may still sue for recovery
for damages caused by unwanted medical treatment, such as burns
received from defibrillation or broken ribs from manual resuscita-
tion.183  Plaintiffs can also sue for the medical costs incurred by
unwanted treatment.184  For example, in Anderson v. St. Francis-St.
George Hospital, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that, by
administering CPR to a patient who had a DNR order at his request,
the nurse breached the duty of honoring the patient’s wishes.185  How-
ever, the Court recognized that the only damages recoverable were
those suffered by the patient directly caused by the battery, in this
179 Wright v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 728 A.2d 166, 178-79 (Md. 1999).
180 Estate of Taylor v. Munice Med. Investors, 727 N.E.2d 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
181 Werth v. Taylor, 475 N.W.2d 426 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Leach v. Shapiro, 469
N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). The sentiments of the courts are similar to those
expressed by the President’s Bioethics Commission which states, “Even when people are
prepared to execute living wills, it is doubtful whether they have clear and definite ideas
about the treatment they would want if and when they become incapacitated. There are, to
begin with, simply too many possible future situations that the patient must try to imagine,
each with its unique combination of burdens, benefits, and risks, making the notion of
“informed consent” long in advance of treatment a highly questionable one. And those
patients who are tempted to reject certain kinds of future medical intervention (on the
ground that they “wouldn’t want to live like that”) may not understand how short-term use
of some of the same interventions could restore them to basic or even normal function.”
182 Benoy v Simons, 831 P.2d 167, 170 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Klavan v. Crozer-Chester
Med. Ctr., 60 F.Supp.2d 436 (E.D. Pa 1999); Anderson v. St. Francis – St. George Hosp.,
Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ohio 1996).
183 Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
184 Gragg v Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282, 1285-86 (Ill. 1998); First Healthcare Corp. v.
Rettinger, 456 S.E.2d 347 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995), rev’d, 467 S.E.2d 243 (N.C. 1996). In an
action to recover for nursing home services rendered to a patient who was kept alive by
means of a nasogastric tube and who had executed a living will, the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment for plaintiff nursing home where genuine issues existed as to
whether the attending physician directed the removal of the nasogastric tube and whether
a second physician confirmed the attending physician’s conclusion that the patient’s
condition was terminal and incurable before the tube was removed by court order as was
required by the living will statute, N.C.G.S. § 90-321. If the statutory requirements were
met, then defendant would be responsible only for charges from the date they were met
until her husband would have died had the tube been removed, instead of for charges from
the date she requested removal of the tube until he actually died some four months later.
185 Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp. Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ohio 1996).
33
Bedzow: Advance Directives: A Case of Changing Social Norms and Their Leg
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
Spring 2016] ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 129
case the administration of CPR.186 The Court ruled that there was no
cause of action in wrongful prolongation of life or even for the pain
and suffering that resulted from the extension of the patient’s life.187
Under intentional tort theories, a victim may also collect damages for
the dignitary harm of being treated without consent,188 yet, in these
cases, the courts offer nominal damages at best.189  Also, while it is in
theory possible to award damages for pain and suffering, in most end-
of-life cases the patient is unconscious and therefore unaware of any
pain or suffering, so proof of damages is impossible.190
In two wrongful living suits, plaintiffs were awarded monetary
compensation by the jury for damages, yet they were either subse-
quently reduced by the judge or justified on other grounds.  In a 1996
case, a Michigan jury awarded $16.5 million to the family of Brenda
Young, a comatose woman who was giving life-sustaining treatment
against her will.191 Yet on appeal, the court reduced the jury’s award
to $1.4 million.192 Similarly, in 2007, a Florida jury awarded a nursing
home resident $150,000 in a wrongful living suit; the court upheld the
award but only on the theory that the plaintiff’s advance directive was
part of her contract with the nursing home.193  Therefore, the award
186 Id. at 229.
187 Id. at 228; see also Estate of Taylor v. Munice Med. Investors, 727 N.E.2d 466 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000) (the court affirmed that Ind. Code § 16-36-1-8 did not support a wrongful
prolongation of life cause of action); Cronin v. Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 875 N.Y.S.2d 222
(N.Y. App. Div. 2009); Scheible v. Joseph L. Morse Geriatric Ctr., 988 So.2d 1130 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
188 FRANK J. VANDALL ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND PROBLEMS 15 (2d ed. 2003).
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was based on a breach of contract and not on a tort or a statutory
liability.194
The immunity provided in state statutes and the difficulty for
plaintiffs to win wrongful life claims provide the other half of the
debate over autonomy in right-to-die cases.  While legislation and the
courts protect patient autonomy regarding directing that a patient’s
wishes be followed, they protect the ethical autonomy of the medical
professional by refusing to award damages if those wishes are not fol-
lowed.  Medical professionals are not coerced to withhold and with-
draw treatment, except in rare circumstances when the patient cannot
be transferred.  They are also allowed to practice according to their
professional standards, which indirectly reinforces the state interest of
protecting the ethics of the medical profession.  Statutory immunity
and the court’s unwillingness to award damages reinforces respect for
the decision-making of the physician, which includes understanding
the medical situation and complying with the wishes of the patient
within the physician’s understanding of the patient’s wishes or pre-
sumed wishes.
CONCLUSION
With respect to care of the elderly, research has shown that the
end-of-life wishes of many Americans are not fulfilled due to the lack
of clear communication to health care providers.195  This causes dis-
trust of the medical profession, confusion among patients and their
families over end-of-life care, and a high economic and social burden
in terms of medical costs and family caregiving.  Rather than under-
standing the controversy over “death with dignity” and the “right to
die” as that between the rights of the individual and the interests of
the state. It would be more fruitful to understand it as being between
demanding greater patient autonomy on the one hand and avoiding
violations of patient autonomy and that of the medical provider on the
other. A shift in orientation would ameliorate the friction between
patients and their caregivers, it could provide a more productive
means for recognizing the underlying concerns that give rise to this
tension, and it might give way to an approach to end-of-life care that
finds a proper balance in protecting the rights of individuals.  It may
also promote shared decision-making between patients and health
care providers, allowing for advance care planning rather than poten-
tially ambiguous advance directives.
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